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Abstract
We experimentally examine the effects of varying time pressure in a coor-
dination game with a label salient focal equilibrium. We consider both a
pure coordination game (payoff symmetry) and a battle of the sexes game
with conflict of interest (payoff asymmetry). In symmetric games, there
are no effects of time pressure, since the label-salient outcome is highly fo-
cal regardless of how much time subjects have to decide. In asymmetric
games, less time results in greater focality of the the label-salient action,
and it becomes significantly more likely that any coordination is on the
focal outcome.
Keywords: Coordination game; focal point; time pressure; response times;
social heuristics hypothesis; experiment.
JEL Classification: C70; C72; C92.
1 Introduction
Coordination games capture many important economic situations, such as mar-
ket entry, macroeconomic policy coordination, choice of product standards,
contract agreement, as well as everyday life situations such as when and where
to meet someone else. Coordination situations have multiple equilibria, hence
strategic uncertainty, and so it is not a priori obvious exactly how coordina-
tion can be ensured. There is consequently a risk of coordination failure (see
Devetag and Ortmann, 2007; Van Huyck et al., 1997).
An important conjecture is that players may be able to achieve a high de-
gree of coordination by coordinating their beliefs and actions on a focal point
(Schelling, 1960). We use this term to denote a payoff irrelevant aspect or fea-
ture of the game that can help the players coordinate. Examples of such focal
points include past behavior, a convention, a shared culture, and the framing
*Centre for Behavioural and Experimental and Social Science and School of Economics, Univer-
sity of East Anglia, Norwich NR47TJ, United Kingdom. Email: a.poulsen@uea.ac.uk
†Corresponding author; University of Vienna, Vienna Center for Experimental Economics,
Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090 Vienna, Austria and Institute for Advanced Studies, Insight Aus-
tria, Josefsta¨dter Straße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria. Email: sonntag@ihs.ac.at.
1
of options and payoffs (see Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et al., 2013; Lewis, 1969;
Parravano and Poulsen, 2015; Poulsen et al., 2016; Schelling, 1960; Sugden and
Zamarro´n, 2006; Sugden, 2011).1
In this paper, we experimentally consider how the power of a focal point in
a coordination game is affected by an arguably fundamental economic aspect,
namely time available for thinking and deciding what to do. We exogenously
vary how much time is available, and thus impose varying degrees of time
pressure on the decision makers. It seems highly economically relevant to study
time pressure in coordination games. In real life, decision makers often need
to coordinate their decisions, but have varying time available to contemplate
what to do; this may be due to them having other tasks that require attention,
or to various technological constraints (for example, the need to avoid exces-
sive fines for a delayed project start).
The existing literature has found that time pressure affects behavior in a
variety of economic domains (see Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2018, for a recent
survey). It leads to more imitation in Cournot oligopoly settings (Buckert et al.,
2014), increases risk aversion (Ben Zur and Breznitz, 1981; Kocher et al., 2013),
slows down convergence and leads to lower payoffs in the beauty contest game
(Kocher and Sutter, 2006). Time pressure also results in lower choice quality in
multi-cue decision problems (Zakay and Wooler, 1984; Rothstein, 1986), and
leads to fewer agreements and higher rejection rates in bargaining situations
(Carnevale and Lawler, 1986).
Most relevant to our study, increased time pressure has also been found to
change the way people reason, from a rational ‘thinking through everything
in detail’ towards more heuristic choice strategies (Payne et al., 1996; Ordonez
and Benson III, 1997). That is, under time pressure, decision makers turn to
simple rules and focus on specific (salient) aspects of a choice problem rather
then processing all information available. Our ex ante hypothesis was that this
would also be the case in interactive coordination games. There is a growing
experimental literature studying how time pressure affects decisions (see next
section for more details), but we are - as far as we know - the first to study the
impact of varying time pressure on the power of focal points in coordination
games.
In our experiment two randomly matched subjects play a tacit simultaneous-
move one-shot coordination game, where each player chooses between two
options, called ‘A’ and ‘B’. Each player choosing A is an equilibrium, as is both
choosing B. We consider two payoff conditions. In the payoff symmetric coor-
dination game (also known as a ‘pure coordination game’) the players are in-
different between coordinating on A or on B, but A is more label-salient than B,
due to A being the first letter in the alphabet. This makes the (A,A) equilibrium
more focal than (B,B). We therefore expect that there would be more coordina-
tion on A than on B, as has been verified in previous work (see Crawford et al.,
2008; Isoni et al., 2013; Parravano and Poulsen, 2015).
Our main focus however is on payoff asymmetric games with conflict of in-
terest, of the ‘battle of the sexes’ type (see e.g. Crawford et al., 2008), where
again both (A,A) and (B,B) are equilibria (there is also an equilibrium in mixed
strategies), but each player now prefers a different equilibrium. Intuitively,
1More generally, a focal point refers to any feature, payoff-based or not, that makes an equi-
librium of the game attractive (see for example Schelling, 1960; Isoni et al., 2014; Galeotti et al.,
2018).
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considerations based on payoff salience (each player desiring to get his or her
highest payoff) now interfere with the label salience of A. Previous research
have found that the focality of label salience is much weaker in asymmetric
than in symmetric games (see Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et al., 2013, 2014;
Parravano and Poulsen, 2015).
Our central research question is: Does more severe time pressure weaken or
strengthen the focality of the (A,A) equilibrium? We had an ex-ante hypothesis,
that the power of label salience, and hence the focality of (A,A), will be stronger
when there was less rather than more time available. Moreover, if the increase
in the focality of (A,A) is sufficiently strong, it might even be possible that
overall coordination and welfare is higher the less time people had to decide.
These hypotheses were in turn based on an underlying conjecture that fo-
cality is primarily intuitive – players will initially notice, and spontaneously
and instinctively wish to act on focality. If they had little time to decide, focal-
ity would consequently be the main driver of behavior. If on the other hand
players have plenty of time available, they tend to become more guided by
payoff-based considerations, and this would weaken the power of the focal
point. Our conjecture is similar to the so-called social heuristics hypothesis
(SHH, see Rand et al., 2012, 2014; Rand, 2016), a leading explanation of find-
ings on reasoning processes and response times in social dilemmas and other
games (see Rand, 2016). In fact, our conjecture for coordination games can be
regarded as applying and suitably modifying the SHH to coordination games.
We conducted experiments under two conditions that differed in how time
pressure was implemented. In Experiment 1 subjects were given a total amount
of time to be used for reading the instructions, thinking about what to do, and
for making a decision. They had either 180 seconds (low Time Pressure) or
45 seconds (high).2 So in Experiment 1 the “clock starts ticking” as soon as
one is introduced to the task. We think this is a simple and realistic model of
real-world decision making under time pressure: there is no free lunch, in the
sense that time spent on any part of a decision task implies less time available
for other parts, and the decision maker decides how much of the total time
to allocate to the each of the decision making phases (reading, thinking, and
deciding).
Our Experiment 2 is a control, where the understanding phase is not made
subject to time pressure. The clock only starts ticking after subjects had read
the instructions and have had opportunities to ask questions, and where it was
thus plausible to assume that each subject had understood the task, and felt
confident that others had understood it as well.3 In Experiment 2 subjects had
either 15 seconds (high Time Pressure) or 180 seconds (low) to make a deci-
sion. If the effects of time pressure on behavior in Experiment 2 and 1 are
qualitatively similar, we have evidence that task understanding is not much of
an issue in our setting, and hence that the results are robust to the exact ‘time
2The selection of these parameters is discussed in section 3.
3Of course, it is very difficult if not impossible to cleanly separate the understanding and the
reasoning phases, since a subject can start to think about what he/she should do as soon as (or
even before) the task has been fully understood. We believe we managed to obtain a reasonable
separation by first giving subjects a general description of the coordination task; subjects were not
told what the specific game payoffs were, so they could not reason about and decide what they
should do. Only when all questions about the task had been answered did the experiment proceed
to the second phase where the specific payoffs were announced and the clock started to count
down.
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pressure technology’.4
Our main findings are as follows. In the symmetric coordination game,
there is no effect of time pressure on coordination behavior. The vast majority
of subjects (more than 90%) choose the label-salient action, A, regardless of
how much time they have.5 These findings are similar to the ones from the
existing literature, see e.g. Parravano and Poulsen (2015) and Crawford et al.
(2008), and with those found in bargaining experiments (see Isoni et al., 2013),
that purely contextual and payoff-irrelevant features can be highly salient in
symmetric settings.
In the asymmetric games, we observe in both Experiment 1 and 2 that
higher time pressure makes it significantly more likely that coordination is due
to both players having chosen A rather than B. Thus, different levels of time
pressure significantly affect the distribution of the surplus between the players.
Nevertheless, there is no significant effect on the overall expected coordination
rate (ECR).6 While higher time pressure weakly significantly increases the ECR
in Experiment 1, there is no discernible effect in Experiment 2. The latter find-
ing is due to the fact that the increase in the subjects’ A choices is not large
enough to cause a significant increase in overall coordination.
A closer look at the data shows that in the asymmetric game Player 1 and 2
react differently to changes in time pressure. Call the player role for whom the
label-salient equilibrium is also the payoff-preferred equilibrium the ‘favoured’
player, and call the other player ‘unfavoured’.7 We observe in both Experiment
1 and 2 that higher time pressure induces a bigger increase in the choice of the
label-salient action among the favoured than the unfavoured players. We con-
jecture that time pressure affects the players’ reasoning (how intuitive it is rela-
tive to being deliberative) and, moreover, due to the payoff asymmetries, these
effects are role-specific. The analysis of subjects’ response times are consistent
with this conjecture.
This explanation is similar to the social heuristics hypothesis for explain-
ing reasoning in social dilemma and public goods games (see Rand et al., 2012,
2014), according to whether variations in time pressure affects the extent to
which reasoning is instinctive or deliberative. We return to this in Section 6.
Our data, as well as findings in the existing literature, suggest a simple ex-
planation for the observed difference between how time pressure affects rea-
soning in social dilemma and coordination games. While in social dilemma
situations more deliberation tends to make a player more likely to defect, in a
coordination game with payoff asymmetries it leads to greater uncertainty and
ambivalence about what the other player will do, and less confidence in and
hence reliance on a focal point. Moreover, when the game is asymmetric, these
effects are role-specific.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some
related literature. In Section 3 we describe the coordination games, the exper-
imental design, and the logistics. Theories and hypotheses are described in
Section 4. The findings are described in Section 5. Section 6 describes a con-
4We discuss additional design choices regarding time pressure in section 7.
5All symmetric data were collected for Experiment 1 only. Since these data were so unequivocal,
we decided there was no need to collect data for symmetric games in Experiment 2.
6ECR is the probability that, given the empirical choice behavior, a randomly selected pair of
players achieve coordination. More details are given below.
7This terminology was introduced in Isoni et al. (2013); see also Isoni et al. (2014).
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jecture for the data, and relate it to the social heuristics hypothesis. Section 7
discusses some limitations and possible future research. Section 8 concludes.
The instructions and various additional findings can be found in the Online
Appendix.
2 Related Literature
There are several experimental studies of focal points in coordination games
(see Bardsley et al., 2009; Bett et al., 2016; Blume and Gneezy, 2000, 2010; Craw-
ford et al., 2008; Van Huyck et al., 1992; Isoni et al., 2013, 2014; Mehta et al., 1994;
Parravano and Poulsen, 2015; Schelling, 1960). None of these studies gave sub-
jects an explicit amount of time for making a decision, and none report subjects’
response times.8 Thus we do not currently know if and how different degrees
of time pressure affect the power of focal points in such situations.
There has recently been extensive research on how time pressure and sub-
ject response times are related to contribution decisions in public goods and
social dilemma games (see Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2018). A broader inves-
tigation is reported in Rubinstein (2007). Much of this work is motivated by
the issue of whether self-regarding (conversely, pro-social behavior) is mainly
a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, or rather a result of deliberate reason-
ing. Some findings suggest the former, see for example Rand (2016), Cappelen
et al. (2015), Lotito et al. (2013), Rand et al. (2014), Rand et al. (2012), Evans
et al. (2015), and Krajbich et al. (2015).9
Time pressure and response times have also been investigated in a vari-
ety of other well-known strategic games, see for example Rubinstein (2007).
In Dictator Games, Cappelen et al. (2015) observe that fairness seems to be
an intuitive phenomenon: fair dictators make their decisions faster than un-
fair ones. In the Ultimatum Game, Sutter et al. (2003) find that severe time
pressure makes Responders more likely to reject offers, but this effect tends to
become smaller over time. See also Cappelletti et al. (2011) and Bran˜as Garza
et al. (2017). Kocher and Sutter (2006) compare behavior in the beauty contest
under high and low time pressure and find that time pressure reduces deci-
sion quality if it is implemented as a hard deadline (as it is in our experiment).
However, in a third treatment, in which the payoff continuously falls the longer
a decision takes (‘shrinking pie’), decisions were made faster and their average
quality even improved.
3 Experimental Design and Logistics
3.1 The Coordination Games
The coordination games were one-shot simultaneous move games, and with-
out any communication. Each experimental subject played only one game.
In the symmetric game, both players get the same payoff, e10, if they both
choose A, and the same if both choose B, and otherwise each player gets no
8A few bargaining experiments, such as Isoni et al. (2014) and Galeotti et al. (2018), give people
an explicit time budget for reaching an agreement, but the time available is not varied.
9There are however also findings that suggest that the opposite can be true – see Døssing et al.
(2017), Lohse (2016), Piovesan and Wengstro¨m (2009), and Tingho¨g et al. (2013).
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money (see Table 1a). In the asymmetric coordination game, Player 1 (2) gets
e12 (e10) from (A,A), the opposite from (B,B), and a failure to coordinate on A
or B again means that no one gets anything. There is thus conflict of interest,
in that Player 1 prefers coordination on A while Player 2 prefers coordination
on B (see Table 1b).
Table 1: The coordination games
P2
P1 A B
A 10, 10 0, 0
B 0, 0 10, 10
(a) symmetric
P2
P1 A B
A 12, 10 0, 0
B 0, 0 10, 12
(b) asymmetric
Notes: The numbers are money amounts in Euros.
3.2 The Task
Subjects were shown two cards on their computer screens, one labelled “A”,
and the other “B”. The “A” (“B”) card was always shown to the left (right).10
Subjects were informed they each had to choose one of the cards without know-
ing the other subject’s choice. All money payoffs were common knowledge.
The decision screens are shown in Figure 1. In Experiment 1 (see part a
of the figure), subjects saw a single screen that showed how much time was
remaining, the instructions, and subjects made their decision by clicking on the
desired option at the bottom of the same screen. Thus everything was made
subject to time pressure (reading instructions, understanding, thinking, and
deciding).
In Experiment 2 (see part b of Figure 1), subjects were first on a separate
screen (see Online Appendix) presented with the instructions and they read
these under no time pressure. The instructions explained that there would be
a card selection task and that subjects would earn money only if they chose
the same card, but subjects were not told what the exact payoffs were. When
all subjects had understood the instructions and had asked any questions, the
group were presented with a decision screen where, with time counting down,
they saw the specific money payoffs for each card, and they made their de-
cision. Thus the difference between Experiment 1 and 2 is whether the read-
ing and understanding phase of the game was subjected to time pressure (Ex-
periment 1) or not (2). As already mentioned in the Introduction, we see
Experiment 1 as the more externally valid implementation of time pressure,
and Experiment 2 as controlling for the potential objection/issue (to inference
drawn from Experiment 1 data) that in Experiment 1 subjects may have rushed
10Thus the properties of ‘being labelled A’ and ‘being shown on the left’ were perfectly cor-
related. A possible control is one where there are no letters; here only ‘leftness’ and ‘rightness’
properties can act as potential label based focal points. We suspect this framing would be much
weaker than using letters. Another control would show the option ‘A’ and ‘B’ on the right and
left side, respectively. Nevertheless, the latter seems quite artificial: given that the framing of the
options is in terms of letters, it seems natural that these should be listed in the order of the alphabet.
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through the instructions (or believe others had), which could have affected
their understanding and coordination behaviour.
After subjects had chosen the card (but before they knew what the other
subject had done and thus whether they had managed to coordinate or not),
they were asked a number of questions, such as age and gender, and whether
they thought they had time enough, and whether they believed they had un-
derstood the task (see Online Appendix). In Experiment 2 we also asked them
to estimate what card they thought the other subject had chosen.
As a measure of cognitive sophistication, we also asked them in both Ex-
periment 1 and 2 to do the Raven task (Raven, 1941) – for details, see Online
Appendix, Section 2.2. As an additional measure of cognitive sophistication,
subjects in Experiment 2 also took part in a version of the Cognitive Reflection
Test (Frederick, 2005); see again the Online Appendix.11
3.3 Time Available
The time available was exogenously set.
• In Experiment 1, subjects had 180 seconds in the low time pressure con-
dition, and 45 seconds in the high time pressure condition.
• In Experiment 2, subjects had 180 seconds in the low time pressure con-
dition, and 15 seconds in the high time pressure condition.
We decided on these parameters based on informal pre-testing. We sought
to establish an environment where low time pressure allowed for plenty of
time to decide such that, in effect, there was no time pressure (see Lindner
and Sutter, 2013, for a similar design choice).12 In fact, the data show that in
the low time pressure condition all subjects, also in Experiment 1, decide well
before the 180 seconds deadline. We of course wanted high time pressure to
be clearly relevant, yet we also had to avoid giving participants so little time
that they could not properly reflect on what to do. We seem to have succeeded
in balancing these opposing considerations, since we do indeed observe that
subjects under low time pressure on average need more time to decide than
what they have available (45 or 15 seconds) under in the high time pressure
condition; so the time in the high time pressure condition is “binding”. At the
same time, the answers to our survey questions indicate that participants felt
they had been given enough time to understand the task. See Figures 4 and A.1
as well as Table 3 below for more details on response times.
3.4 Experimental Logistics
The experiment was conducted at the Vienna Center for Experimental Eco-
nomics (VCEE) lab of the University of Vienna and was implemented using
oTree (Chen et al., 2016). In total 336 subjects participated in 17 sessions and
earned an average of e9.70 for about 40 minutes of their time. As already men-
tioned, each subject played one game only.
11We used the 3 original items, but added 3 new items (Primi et al., 2016) because the original
items – due to their frequent use – might had become known by the subjects.
12In our data the slowest subject in a 180 second condition took 124 seconds to make his/her
choice, i.e., the time limit of 180 seconds was indeed not restricting our subjects.
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Figure 1: Decision screens
(a) Experiment 1
(b) Experiment 2
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Table 2: Treatments and observations
Time pressure
Symmetry Low High
Sym (exp.1) 48 50
Asym (exp.1) 48 68
Asym (exp.2) 62 60
4 Hypotheses
As already stated in the Introduction, the main hypothesis that motivated our
experiment was that having less time available for deciding could increase co-
ordination on a focal point.
Hypothesis 1. The proportion of subjects in either role choosing A is decreasing in
time given to decide (increasing in time pressure), in both the symmetric and the asym-
metric game.
Our intuition was that focality is primarily intuitive and spontaneous, such
that players more or less immediately notice and perceive choosing the A op-
tion as being more attractive and obvious than B, in both the symmetric and
the asymmetric game. However, with enough time players invariably start to
pay attention to the payoffs, and in the asymmetric game note that there is
a conflict of interest. This tends to make them unsure about what the other
player will do. This in turn may make some players more likely to choose the
action that, if coordinated on, would give them the higher money earnings, or
it may make other subjects more likely to choose the action they think the other
subject will choose. Or it increases the amount of random behavior. Thus we
would expect a dispersion in behavior away from the focal point.
The above hypothesis can be contrasted with the (null) hypothesis that
changes in time pressure have no effect on behavior whatsoever. This is the
Nash equilibrium prediction, which is silent on what the effects of time pres-
sure should be, since time to think and decide play no role.
An alternative hypothesis is that more time is beneficial. Subjects need time
to understand and fully appreciate the multiplicity of equilibria in the coordi-
nation game, and the equilibrium selection problem they face. They will then
eventually realise that coordination on the label-salient outcome (A,A) is the
best way to avoid coordination failure. This will be true in both the symmet-
ric and the asymmetric game, and in both roles, although we naturally expect
more coordination on (A,A) in the symmetric than in the asymmetric game.
This hypothesis appears similar to a hypothesis that subjects are “team reason-
ers” (Sugden, 2003; Bacharach, 2006; Bardsley et al., 2009), according to which
subjects reason as a team and identify the behavior that is jointly optimal. Since
it takes time to go through this reasoning, it seems intuitive that more time
is beneficial. This approach predicts that lower time pressure makes it more
likely that players achieve achieve coordination on the label-salient (A,A) equi-
librium.
9
We can also consider the effects of changes in time pressure on the expected
coordination rate and players’ welfare. Let p (q) denote the proportion of
Player 1s (2s) who play A, where p, q ∈ [0, 1]. Then the expected coordina-
tion rate (ECR) is the probability of coordination on A plus the one on B, that
is, ECR = pq+ (1− p)(1− q). At (p, q), the sum of both players’ total earnings
in the asymmetric game equal ECR×e22.13
ECR, and total earnings, are high whenever both player populations are
concentrated on A, or on B. It follows that if both Player 1 and 2s become
more likely to choose A, then the effect on coordination and overall earnings
is beneficial only if sufficiently many players in each role are already playing
A; otherwise the effect is negative (suppose as an extreme example that almost
everyone initially play B; an increase in play of A then clearly lowers the ex-
pected coordination rate).14 We must therefore not draw the false conclusion
that any increase in play of A (or on B) is automatically beneficial; it depends
on the initial behavior. It follows that an increase in both players’ choice of A
is beneficial only when sufficiently many players are already choosing A. Our
second hypothesis was that the increase in time pressure causes a sufficiently
large increase in play of A by both Player 1 and 2 such that this condition is
satisfied.
Hypothesis 2. A decrease in time available raises the expected coordination rate and
players’ total earnings.
5 Experimental Findings
5.1 Choice Data
Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics on choices, coordination rates, and
response times.15
Finding 1. In the symmetric treatments, almost everyone chooses ‘A’, irrespective of
whether the decision was made under low or high time pressure.
13Equivalently, the sum of total earnings in the symmetric game is ECR×e20.
14As a hypothetical example, let p (q) denote the probability that Player 1 (2) chooses A, and
suppose that in the no time pressure condition, (p, q) = (.4, .4). Then ECR = .52. If higher time
pressure raises play in each population to (p, q) = (.6, .5), then ECR = .5, so coordination drops.
15 The data from the Raven Progressive Matrices and Cognitive Reflection Test can be found in
the Online Appendix. It turns out that neither of these are correlated with choices. The same turns
out to be true for subjects’ age and gender. See Appendix A.2 for details.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Exp 1 - Symmetric Exp 1 - Asymmetric Exp 2 - Asymmetric
Time pressure Low High Low High Low High
N 48 50 48 68 62 60
Choices made in time 48 49 48 66 62 59
Number choosing A (%) 44
(91.67%)
46
(93.88%)
27 (56.25%) pooled
14 (58.33%) P1
13 (54.17%) P2
47 (71.21%) pooled
26 (78.79%) P1
21 (63.64%) P2
29 (46.77%) pooled
13 (41.94%) P1
16 (51.61%) P2
33 (55.93%) pooled
20 (66.67%) P1
13 (44.83%) P2
ECR 84.72% 88.33% 50.69% 57.85% 49.74% 48.28%
on ECRA 84.03% 88.00% 31.60% 50.14% 21.64% 29.89%
on ECRB 0.69% 0.33% 19.10% 7.71% 28.10% 18.39%
MSNE ECR 50% 50% 49.59% 49.59% 49.59% 49.59%
Exp. payoff (in EUR,
excl. part. fee)
8.47 8.85 5.70 P1
5.45 P2
6.79 P1
5.94 P2
5.41 P1
5.54 P2
5.43 P1
5.20 P2
Av. response time (secs) 46.29 31.18 56.79 P1
47.29 P2
33.76 P1
32.38 P2
18.00 P1
20.19 P2
8.23 P1
9.13 P2
Av. response time (secs)
cond. on A
46.59 31.13 57.85 P1
43.76 P2
33.92 P1
29.90 P2
21.62 P1
18.56 P2
7.95 P1
8.69 P2
Av. response time (secs)
cond. on B
43.00 27.66 55.30 P1
51.45 P2
31.71 P1
35.67 P2
15.39 P1
21.93 P2
8.80 P1
9.13 P2
Notes: N: number of observations, ECR: expected coordination rate, ECRA: expected coordination rate on outcome (A,A), ECRB: expected coordination rate on outcome
(B,B), MSNE ECR: expected coordination rate according to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), and Exp. payoff: Expected Payoff in Euros
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In the symmetric games over 90% all players chose A (see Table 3). Moreover,
the number of A choices is not significantly different between the high and the
low time pressure condition (χ2-test: p = 0.674).
Figure 2: Proportions of A choices and expected coordination rates
(a) Exp 1, symmetry, low time pressure
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P1 P2 ECR-A ECR-B
(b) Exp 1, symmetry, high time pressure
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(c) Exp 1, asymmetry, low time pressure
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(d) Exp 1, asymmetry, high time pressure
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(e) Exp 2, asymmetry, low time pressure
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(f) Exp 2, asymmetry, high time pressure
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Notes: P1 and P2 denote the proportion of ‘A’ choices of players 1 and 2, respectively. ECR-A and
ECR-B denote the expected coordination rates on option ‘A’ and ‘B’, respectively.
Finding 2. In the asymmetric games, and for both Experiment 1 and 2, higher time
pressure increases the likelihood of A being chosen for Player 1s, but not Player 2s.
In Experiment 1, for the asymmetric game under low time pressure Player 1s
choose A in 58.33% of cases. Under high time pressure this increases to 78.79%,
which is marginally significantly (χ2-test: p = 0.096). However, for Player
2 this difference is not significantly different (χ2-test: p = 0.472). A similar
pattern can be observed in Experiment 2: under low time pressure Player 1s
choose A in 41.94% of all cases, and under high time 66.67% do so, which is
12
statistically significantly different (χ2-test: p = 0.053). Again, for Player 2 this
difference is not significantly different (χ2-test: p = 0.599).16
5.2 Expected Coordination Rates
The expected coordination rate (ECR) measures the probability that two differ-
ent participants selected at random from the set of all participants of a condi-
tion choose the same action (see Section 4 for how we calculate the ECR).17 We
compare the ECR between our experimental conditions.
In the symmetric treatments very high choice propensities for ‘A’ result in
overall expected coordination rates of over 84% which is much higher than the
expected coordination rates resulting from a MSNE type of play (i.e., 50%, see
Table 3).
In the asymmetric treatments we find ECRs much closer to MSNE play than
in the symmetric treatment. In particular, under low time pressure, in experi-
ments 1 and 2, we find ECRs of 50.69% and 49.74%, respectively. Under high
time pressure, in experiment 1 and 2 we find ECRs of 57.85% and 48.28%, re-
spectively (MSNE prediction: 49.59%, see Table 3). In fact, these expected co-
ordination rates do not seem to be affected by time pressure, too much.
However, a clear pattern of time pressure can be detected if we decompose
the overall ECR into its parts, ECR-A and ECR-B (recall that ECR = ECR-A +
ECR-B). In the asymmetric games, we observe in both Experiment 1 and 2 that
the difference ECR-A – ECR-B is larger under high than low time pressure (see
also Figure 2 panels c-f). This is not the case in symmetric games (see Figure 3
below).
Finding 3. In the asymmetric games, and for both Experiment 1 and 2, the overall
expected coordination rate ECR does not seem to be affected by time pressure, but we
observe a clear shift towards coordination on A rather than on B becoming much more
likely under high than under low time pressure.
5.3 Response Times
In this section we consider subjects’ response times (cf. Table 3; histograms can
be found in the Online Appendix).18 We first observe that the response times
are significantly longer, the more time subjects have to decide (p < 0.001).
That is, giving people less time to decide, makes them decide faster. This,
combined with the fact that very few subjects run out of time when making
a decision, show that subjects in the low time pressure condition find the less
time available behaviourally relevant. Furthermore, subjects made decisions
(marginally) faster in symmetric than in asymmetric games (Ranksum tests:
low time pressure: p = 0.048, high time pressure: p = 0.095).
16Pooling role 1 and role 2 players’ A choices and analysing them jointly reveals a marginally
significant difference across time pressure conditions in experiment 1, but no significant difference
in experiment 2 (χ2-tests: p = 0.098 and p = 0.314 for experiment 1 and 2, respectively).
17Whether or not a pair of subjects actually coordinates in the lab does not only depend on their
choices, but also on their specific random matching of the subjects. Thus we follow the standard
approach by calculating expected rather than the actually observed coordination rate.
18As was the case for choices (see footnote 15), neither performance in the Raven Progressive
Matrices nor in the Cognitive Reflection Test add much insight into the determinants of response
times – see Appendix A.2
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Figure 3: ECR bootstrapping
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In addition to the above, there are some noteworthy features regarding dif-
ferent response times by player role (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). For
example, in Experiment 1, it takes longer for Player 1 than 2 to choose A under
low time pressure (57.85 versus 43.76 seconds, Ranksum test: p = 0.042). It also
takes longer for Player 2 to choose B than A (51.45 versus 43.76, Ranksum test:
p = 0.072). A qualitatively similar pattern of response times can be observed
in Experiment 2, but this is not significant (P1-A: 21.62, P2-A: 18.56, ranksum
test: p = 0.453; P2-B: 21.93, P2-A: 18.56, ranksum test: p = 0.127). In the next
section, we reconcile these role specific response time patterns with the role
specific choice patterns identified earlier and speculate on how subjects made
their choices in our experiment.
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Figure 4: Response times
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6 A Conjecture
How can we explain the finding that it is especially Player 1 who becomes
more likely to choose the salient action A when time pressure increases? Our
conjecture is that there are two decision phases, and that one tends to take place
before the other.
Phase 1: Spontaneous/instinctive thinking The players first notice and con-
sider the labels (A and B), and if this was the end of the story, both players
would be very likely to choose A.
Phase 2: Best reply thinking As time passes, players start to note and con-
sider the money payoffs from each option, and in the asymmetric games it thus
gradually dawns upon the subjects that they prefer different options. It be-
comes more and more likely that the players become predominantly engaged
in best reply thinking, that is choosing the action they think their counterpart
is likely to choose. Moreover, and crucially, due the role asymmetries of the
game, the players hold different beliefs about their counterparts’ behavior. Re-
call that Player 1 is the one who prefers coordination on the label salient (A,A)
outcome. Intuitively, Player 2 has two ‘good reasons’ to expect Player 1 to
choose A: (A,A) gives 1 more money than (B,B), and it is label-salient. To the
contrary, Player 1 has only one good reason to expect 2 to choose A: it is label-
salient. This suggests that Player 2 is more likely than 1 to believe that the
counterpart will choose A.
This intuition suggests that going from spontaneous to best reply thinking
decreases Player 1’s likelihood to choose A by more than 2’s. It follows that
giving players less time, which makes it more likely that players are sponta-
neous thinkers instead of best responders, causes a greater switch from B to A
by Player 1s than 2s. This is what our data show.
This conjecture also helps to organize subjects’ response times (Section 5.3).
We would predict that when people have more time available, more become
deliberate (best reponse) reasoners; assuming that deliberate reasoning takes
more time than intuitive reasoning, response times should be higher. This is
what we find.Second, let us assume not only that it takes more time to think
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deliberately than intuitively, but also that, within the group of deliberate rea-
soners, the more ‘thinking steps’ are involved the more time it takes. In this
case our conjecture suggests that it would take longer for Player 1 than 2 to
choose A. Recall our argument that a best responding Player 1 has fewer “rea-
sons” to choose A than 2, so those Player 1s who ended up choosing A must
have spent more time agonizing over their decision than 2. Put differently, it
is “easier”, and hence quicker for Player 2 to choose A than it is for Player 1,
and we expect this to lead to a differences in response times across player roles
similar to those observed.
Our conjecture is similar to the social heuristics hypothesis (SHH, see Rand,
2016), according to which people bring automatic, intuitive responses that have
worked well in the real life situations people repeatedly face (such as an in-
finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game where cooperation is optimal and
possible to sustain) into the lab, where the situation is often quite different
(such as a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game, where defection is now opti-
mal). Intuitive thinking based on the real world repeated game then leads
people to cooperate in the one-shot version played in the lab. On the other
hand, more reflective and deliberative processes will override this automatic
behavior and make people adopt a behavior that is more appropriate for the
situation at hand (defection).
A common feature of our conjecture and the SHH is that initial early think-
ing is mostly intuitive and spontaneous (and hence in a coordination game
drawn to choosing the label salient action); in the asymmetric game more de-
liberate thinking, promoted by having more time available, leads players to
consider the conflict of interest present in the coordination problem (in the
symmetric game this is not present, so more time does not make players less
likely to choose the label-salient action). This in turn makes them less likely
to choose the focal action, which can lower the coordination rate. Moreover,
and this is an important difference from social dilemmas (which are typically
modeled as symmetric games – but see Lotz (2015) for an exception), in an
asymmetric coordination game with a focal point time pressure generates role-
specific effects, due to players reasoning differently about the other players’
expected behavior.
7 Discussion
Our experimental design was meant to have high internal validity and thus
invariably suffers from low external validity in some obvious respects. First,
many real coordination situations are likely to have a much larger action set;
second, it is unlikely that players’ payoffs are common knowledge. Finally, the
players may be able to engage in pre-play communication. All these aspects
can be investigated in future work.
One objection is that the time amount we gave our subjects have no connec-
tion with how much time people have to think and decide in the real world.
People may have several days, weeks or months to decide; thus there is in
terms of our setup no or very little time pressure, so our investigation might
not be seen as very relevant for the real world. However, we point out that
in the so-called real world, people are typically at any point in time engaged
in a multitude of tasks, while in our setup subjects only have a single task to
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focus on; so even though in real life there may be days or weeks to decide on
any given task, given the task congestion the effective time pressure on each
individual task may be much higher and not that different from the parameters
chosen in our experimental environment.
8 Conclusion
This paper is the first to consider the effects of time pressure on the power
of a label-based focal point in payoff symmetric and asymmetric coordination
games. We find that as time pressure increases in games with payoff asymme-
tries (conflict of interest), a greater proportion of the observed coordination is
on the label-salient outcome. We offer a conjecture, similar to the social heuris-
tics hypothesis (Rand, 2016), for our findings, namely that in games focality
based on label salience is primarily an intuitive concept – something people
are spontaneously attracted to and act upon, while more lengthy and deliber-
ative thinking makes people abandon label-based focality in favour of more
best-reply based thinking.
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A Appendix
A.1 Instructions
All instructions were displayed on computer screens and were also read aloud
by the experimenters. Screenshots can be found in the Online Appendix.
A.2 Further Results
A.2.1 Regressions
Table A.1: Probability of choosing A
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High time pressure 0.0436 0.0510 0.0918 0.0291
(0.104) (0.108) (0.0911) (0.106)
Asymmetric game -0.331∗∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗
(0.0844) (0.0851)
Asymmetric game x high time pressure 0.0650 0.0468
(0.123) (0.123)
Raven score -0.0196 0.00469
(0.0130) (0.0223)
CRT score -0.0164
(0.0303)
Age -0.00630 0.0199∗
(0.00502) (0.0118)
Male 0.0147 0.182∗
(0.0559) (0.101)
Swiftness 0.000953 -0.00647∗
(0.00283) (0.00390)
Decision time -0.0000383 0.000737
(0.00210) (0.00404)
Observations 211 211 121 121
Log.Likelihood -97.56 -95.73 -83.33 -78.82
Chi-squared 28.68 32.35 1.016 10.02
Notes: This Table contains marginal effects from Probit regressions. CRT scores were only mea-
sured in experiment 2. Standard errors in parentheses; levels of significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.2: Response times
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High time pressure -15.37∗∗∗ -15.21∗∗∗ -10.52∗∗∗ -10.60∗∗∗
(2.763) (2.737) (2.155) (2.264)
Asymmetric game 5.750∗∗ 5.683∗∗
(2.777) (2.870)
Asymmetric game x high time pressure -3.941 -3.554
(3.781) (3.770)
Raven score 0.565 0.154
(0.432) (0.509)
CRT score 0.750
(0.698)
Age 0.402∗∗ -0.149
(0.172) (0.247)
Male 0.714 2.698
(1.875) (2.369)
Swiftness 0.125 0.0631
(0.0912) (0.0882)
decision a -0.201 0.421
(2.400) (2.265)
Constant 46.29∗∗∗ 25.95∗∗∗ 19.10∗∗∗ 17.65∗∗
(1.964) (7.808) (1.505) (8.888)
Observations 211 211 121 121
Adjusted R2 0.289 0.310 0.160 0.146
Log. Likelihood -848.2 -842.5 -469.8 -468.2
Notes: This Table contains coefficients from linear regressions. CRT scores were only measured in
experiment 2. Standard errors in parentheses; levels of significance: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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A.2.2 Graphs
Figure A.1 shows the response times per action and player role. Histograms of
response times can be found in the Online Appendix.
Figure A.1: Average response times by choice and player role
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